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Abstract. The shot-noise unit (SNU) is a crucial factor for the practical security
of a continuous-variable quantum key distribution system. In the most widely used
experimental scheme, the SNU should be calibrated first and acts as a constant during
the key distribution. However, the SNU of a practical system is dependent on the
various parameters of the local oscillator, which can be controlled by the eavesdropper
in the open channel. In this paper, we report a quantum hacking method to control the
practical SNU by using the limited compensation rate of the polarization compensation.
Since the compensation is only based on of the polarization measurement results of
part of local oscillator pulses, the polarization of other unmeasured pulses may not
be compensated correctly, which can be utilized by the eavesdropper to control the
practical SNU. The simulation and experiment results indicate that the practical SNU
can be controlled by the eavesdropper. Thus, the eavesdropper can use the fact that
the practical SNU is no longer equals to the calibrated one to control the excess noise
and final key rate.
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21. Introduction
Continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) ensures that two legal
parties(Alice and Bob) generate secure keys through an untrusted channel [1, 2]. The
physical implementation of CV-QKD using Gaussian modulated coherent state is based
on optical communication techniques which are beneficial to a wide range of practical
applications [3, 4, 5]. With the development of CV-QKD experiment [6, 7, 8, 9, 10],
the transmission distance of CV-QKD system in the field test has reached 50km, which
is enough to support the construction of metropolitan networks [11, 12]. Meanwhile,
CV-QKD protocols based on Gaussian modulated coherent state have been proved to
be theoretically secure against general attacks both in the asymptotic case [13, 14, 15]
and the finite-size regime [16, 17]. The recently proposed user-defined QKD [18] that
allows one to securely construct the protocol using arbitrary non-orthogonal states, thus
will promote the security and implementation of discrete-modulated CV-QKD.
Although the theoretical security of CV-QKD protocols has been proved, many
assumptions are made in the process of security analysis. However, the imperfect
linearity of the homodyne detector and the transmittance of the beam splitter can be
utilized by the eavesdropper to implement saturation attack [19, 20] and wavelength
attacks [21, 22]. The shot-noise unit (SNU) should be constant and act as a
normalization parameter of quadrature measurement results [1]. The calibrated SNU is
measured by Bob via the interference between the local oscillator (LO) and the vacuum
mode before the key distribution. Because the quadrature measurement results of Bob
is normalized by the calibrated SNU but scaled with the practical SNU, the consistency
of the calibrated and the practical SNU is crucial for the security of a CV-QKD system.
The LO is a necessary auxiliary light beam for homodyne detection and the calibration
of the SNU, which is assumed not to be tampered by eavesdropper [23]. As a result,
eavesdropper can bias the practical SNU by manipulating the LO in the channel when
CV-QKD system is running [24, 25, 26]. In the existing quantum hacking scheme, the
eavesdropper changes the practical SNU by controlling the delay between the LO and
the sampling clock [24] or the intensity of LO [25], so as to reduce the estimation result
of excess noise.
In this paper, we propose a polarization attack method against the CV-QKD system
by manipulating the polarization of the LO pulses during key distribution. Because the
polarization drift rate is usually slower than the repetition frequency of the CV-QKD
system, the polarization compensation in a practical CV-QKD system is implemented
by measuring a part of LO pulses, which defined as reference LO pulses here. Although
the physical implementation is simplified in this way, unmeasured LO pulses can be
easily manipulated by the eavesdropper to control the practical SNU. The eavesdropper
can make the calibrated and practical SNU unequal by applying the polarization attack
to hide the introduced excess noise.
The paper is organized as followed: In section 2, we explain the polarization
attack method in detail. The eavesdropper can arbitrarily change the practical SNU by
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Figure 1. (a) Experimental setup of CV-QKD system [12]. (b) Details of the
polarization after the attack. BS1: 1/99 beam splitter BS2: 50/50 beam splitter PBC:
polarization beam coupler, DPC: dynamic polarization controller, PBS: polarization
beam splitter, PM: phase modulation. Homodyne detector [27] consists of two
photodiodes and a subtractor. Eve controls the orientation angle of the unmeasured
LO pulses. The number of reference LO pulses is M , the cycle of the polarization
compensation is N LO pulses.
applying specific polarization modulation on the unmeasured LO pulses. In section 3,
the estimated transmittance and excess noise under this attack are given. Alice and
Bob will incorrectly estimate the excess noise and a security loophole reveals when
the practical SNU is not equivalent to the calibrated value. In section 4, numerical
simulation results demonstrate that the secret key rate will be overestimated by Alice
and Bob when the practical SNU is controlled by Eve. The conclusion and the
countermeasure against the polarization attack are discussed in section 5.
2. Control the practical shot-noise unit by the polarization attack
2.1. Polarization compensation technology
In current physical implementation of CV-QKD protocols [6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12], the LO
is transmitted together with the signal in one fiber simultaneously to reduce the phase
noise generated during the transmission. Time and polarization multiplexing are used
in Alice to reduce the crosstalk from the LO (Fig. 1 (a)), while time and polarization
demultiplexing are applied by Bob before his homodyne detection. The polarization drift
rate of optical pulses in the channel can increase the loss of the signal and the crosstalk
from the LO. So polarization compensation is necessary to promote the performance of
the system. The current compensation scheme is based on polarization measurement
and real-time feedback which depends on the polarization measurement result of the
LO.
4The polarization compensation implemented in this paper is the general scheme
in commercial fiber application. Firstly, a small part of the LO will be divided by a
beam-splitter whose polarization state will be measured to calculate the drift from the
target polarization state with high precision. Then a feedback signal is generated based
on the measured drift and modulated on a polarization controller to compensate the
drift.
The polarization of optical pulses in a fiber can be described by the orientation
angle θ and elliptic angle ϕ, where θ and ϕ are used to characterize the orientation and
degree of linear polarization respectively. Since the polarization extinction ratio of the
laser source in a CV-QKD system is always higher than 30dB (e.g. the laser module
from NKT photonics), it is reasonable to assume all optical pulses as linearly polarized.
Thus, the elliptic angle of a linearly polarized optical pulse is 0◦, and only the effect of
the orientation angle is considered in this paper.
Compared to the high repetition frequency of the system, the polarization drifts
slowly enough and can be compensated by only measuring reference LO pulses. For
example, the polarization drift rate in the aerial fiber with gale is 34rad/s, which is
several orders of magnitude faster than in the underground fiber [28]. The polarization
measurement rate of current commercial devices can reach 2MHz such as EPC1000
(Novoptel) and PSY-201 (General Photonics). If the polarization drift threshold is
set as 10−5rad per pulse which introduces negligible noise in a system, the necessary
compensation rate is just 340kHz. For the CV-QKD system transmitted in the
underground fiber, a polarization compensation with kHz rate is efficient enough without
any technical barriers. Moreover, the repetition frequency of the current mature CV-
QKD system is 5MHz and is still increasing [12]. Thus it’s efficient for Bob only to
choose a part of the LO pulses in a cycle of the compensation to estimate the drift of
the all pulses.
The cycle of compensation is set as N pulses and we consider the polarization
difference of those N pulses is within the threshold. Thus, Bob chooses M(M ≤ N) LO
pulses to measure their polarization, which is the reference of the feedback. Eve can
determine the reference pulses from all LO pulses by some simple tests. For example, Eve
firstly chooses a part of LO pulses to modulate their polarization in one compensation
cycle. Because the practical channel parameters (transmittance and excess noise) are
controlled by Eve. By comparing the estimated channel parameters, Eve can judge
whether these LO pulses are reference pulses. All reference pulses can be determined
by Eve performing multiple similar tests.
The LO and signal pulses are split by polarization beam splitters (PBS) into their
respective optical path after polarization demultiplexing. If the polarization of the
N −M unmeasured LO pulses is not the same as those of the M reference LO pulses,
the polarization of this N −M LO pulses cannot be compensated correctly. As shown
in Fig. 1 (b), the orientation of M reference LO pulses is parallel to the slow axis of the
PBS but there is a misalignment angle θ between the N−M unmeasured LO pulses and
the slow axis. Then the signal pulses will still be splitted into signal path but the LO
5will also partially leak into the signal path as shown in Fig. 1. Thus, Eve can control
the intensity of N −M unmeasured LO by polarization modulation.
2.2. Control the practical SNU by polarization modulation on the LO
Alice selects two sets of random variables X and P from Gaussian distribution random
numbers whose variance is VA and mean value is 0 to prepare Gaussian modulated
coherent states. The coherent states and the LO pulses are transmitted to Bob in the
same fiber by time-division multiplexing and polarization multiplexing. In the channel,
Eve performs collective attack on the coherent states to acquire information of secret
keys. The polarization attack is implemented to hide the excess noise introduced from
the collective attack. At first, Eve applies some tests to determine the reference pulses.
Then, the orientation angle of the unmeasured pulses is modulated by Eve to control the
practical SNU. At the receiving end, Bob performs homodyne (X or P) or heterodyne
(X and P) detection after polarization compensation and demultiplexing.
Ideally, the slow axis of the PBS is parallel to the orientation angle of all LO pulses
and is orthogonal to the orientation angle of all signal pulses after the polarization
compensation. We assume that Eve introduces a misalignment angle between the slow
axis of the PBS and the orientation angle of the N −M LO pulses. These LO pulses
can be decomposed into the parallel part and the orthogonal part. According to the
Marius’s law, the intensity of the orthogonal part IO which is splitted into the signal
path is given by
IO = αILO sin θ, (1)
where ILO is the intensity of the LO into the PBS and α is the loss of the PBS. The
intensity of the parallel part IP which is splitted into the LO path is
IP = αILO cos θ. (2)
According to the above analysis, Eve can control the intensity of the LO for homodyne
detection by modulating the orientation angle of the unmeasured LO pulses. The SNU
is proportional to the intensity of the LO [29],
N0 = αkILO
〈
∆X2
vac
〉
, (3)
where N0 is the calibrated SNU, k is a proportional constant dependent on the gain and
efficiency of homodyne detector and ∆Xvac is the vacuum fluctuation. As a result, the
practical SNU corresponding to the attacked LO pulses is controlled by Eve to
N ′
0
= αkILO
〈
∆X2
vac
〉
cos θ. (4)
The polarization modulation by Eve may cause the LO to leak into the signal path.
The delay between the LO pulses and the signal pulses ensures that the leaked LO
will not interfere with the signal. Because the extinction ratio of LO pulses cannot be
infinite, there always are some residual photons at the interval of the LO pulses. The
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Figure 2. Theoretical simulation shot noise variance (blue solid line) and
experimentally measured value (red asterisk) under different orientation angle of LO.
polarization modulation will also cause the residual photons to leak to the signal path.
Eve can enhance the extinction ratio or not modulate the polarization of the interval to
remove the leaked residual photons. The homodyne detection result is normalized by
the calibrated SNU which is controlled by Eve under the polarization attack. A simple
experiment is implemented to demonstrate the effect of the polarization of the local
oscillator on the variance of shot noise. The experimental setup is the receiving end in
the Fig1(a). The orientation angle of the LO is modulated from 0◦ to 90◦. The shot noise
variance is measured with different orientation angle. Fig. 2 shows the experimentally
measured shot noise variance with different orientation angle modulation on the LO.
The shot noise variance of 0◦ corresponds to the case without the polarization
attack. According to Eq. 3, we plot a theoretical curve which matches well with the
experimental result. By modulating the orientation angle of the LO, the practical shot
noise variance can be reduced. Therefore, the difference between the calibrated SNU
and the practical one is mastered by Eve, which will cause inaccuracy in parameter
estimation by Alice and Bob.
3. Practical security analysis under the polarization and collective attack
The goal of the quantum hacking is to control the results of parameter estimation
without being noticed, especially the excess noise. In this section, we demonstrate that
Alice and Bob will overestimate the secret key rate under the polarization attack. Based
on the current techniques, Eve can implement a kind of non-Gaussian operation which
is named as intercept resend attack to obtain secret key information [30]. According to
the optimality of Gaussian attack, non-Gaussian attacks will inevitably introduce more
excess noise than Gaussian attacks to obtain the same amount of secret key information.
7It means that Eve must pay more efforts to hide the introduced excess noise. As a result,
the security analysis is derived under collective attack which introduces less excess noise
to acquire more information of the secret key, and the collective attack can be practically
implemented by an entangling cloner attack[31, 32]. If the introduced excess noise
is not hidden, the information of secret key available for Eve can be estimated and
excluded by the privacy amplification [33]. In the system with imperfect polarization
compensation, the introduced excess noise can be concealed in the parameter estimation
by manipulating the orientation angle of the unmeasured LO pulses.
The polarization attack aims at the scheme where the LO and the signal are
polarization multiplexed in one fiber. The attack is also valid to other CV-QKD
protocols which are implemented with similar scheme, such as no-switching protocol [4].
Since X and P quadratures are symmetrical, we give analysis based on the X quadrature
of the homodyne detection for simplicity. The efficiency and electronic noise of the
practical homodyne detector are also not considered in this paper. According to the
model in the security analysis of optimality of Gaussian attacks [13, 14], the homodyne
detection result XB after normalization without attack is [34]
XB=
(√
TXA+Z
)√
N0
√
N0
, (5)
where T is the practical channel transmittance, N0 is the calibrated SNU and Z is the
total noise. To highlight the effect of the difference between the practical shot noise and
calibration value in the parameter estimation, we use the nominator to represent the
homodyne detection output before normalization and the denominator to represent the
calibration shot noise variance which is used to normalized the detection results. The
secret key rate under collective attack is derived from the covariance matrix [1]
γAB =
[
(VA + 1) I
√
T (V 2
A
+ 2VA)σz√
T (V 2
A
+ 2VA)σz (TVA + 1 + Tε) I
]
, (6)
where ε is the practical excess noise, I =
[
1 0
0 1
]
and σz =
[
1 0
0 −1
]
. The
transmittance of the channel T and the excess noise ε are derived with the data of
Alice and the homodyne detection result of Bob,
T =
(
〈XAXB〉
〈X2A〉
)2
ǫ =
〈X2B〉−1−TVA
T
.
(7)
If Eve applies an orientation angle modulation on the unmeasured LO pulses, the
homodyne detection result of the corresponding pulses after normalization reads
X ′
B
=
(√
TXA+Z
)√
N ′
0√
N0
=
√
cos θ
(√
TXA+Z
)
. (8)
8Similar to the Eq. 5, the numerator indicates the homodyne detection output and
the denominator shows the calibrated SNU. Since the practical SNU N ′
0
is not the same
as the calibrated one N0, the normalized measurement results are scaled down by Eve.
Accordingly, the estimated transmittance and the excess noise under attack are
T ′ =
(〈XA [(1− k)X ′B + kXB]〉
〈X2
A
〉
)2
(9)
=
[
(1− k)
√
cos θ + k
]2
T (10)
ǫ′ =
〈
[(1− k)X ′B + kXB]2
〉− 1− T ′VA
T ′
(11)
= ǫ− 1
T

 1[
(1− k)√cos θ + k
]2 − 1

 , (12)
where k is the ratio between the reference LO pulses and the cycle of the compensation
which is known as polarization measurement ratio (PMR). The estimated excess noise
is dependent both on the PMR k and the orientation angle θ. It is obvious that ǫ′ < ǫ.
The PMR is a constant for a specific system, Eve could reduce the estimated excess
noise by modulating the corresponding orientation angle on the unmeasured LO pulses.
Thus, she will hide the introduced excess noise as well as obtain the largest amount of
secret key information. After the attack, the covariance matrix becomes
γ′AB =
[
(VA + 1) I
√
T ′ (V 2
A
+ 2A)σz√
T ′ (V 2
A
+ 2A)σz (T
′VA + 1 + T
′ε′) I
]
. (13)
By comparing the above two covariance matrices Eq. 6 and Eq. 13, the different
elements are the transmittance of the channel and the excess noise which are the decisive
parameters for the secret key rate of CV-QKD. Thus, the difference between the practical
secret key rate K (T, ǫ) and the estimated K (T ′, ǫ′) under the attack is the amount of
the key information which is acquired for Eve. The detailed calculation of secret key K
is shown in the appendix.
4. Secret key rate under the collective attack and polarization attack
Eve’s collective attack will introduce excess noise into the Bob’s measurement result [35].
If Eve doesn’t apply the polarization attack, the transmittance and excess noise which
are estimated by Alice and Bob will be the practical value T and ǫ. When the
polarization attack is implemented to conceal the excess noise, the estimated channel
parameters become T ′ and ǫ′. Since ǫ′ is a function of the practical transmittance and the
modulated orientation angle as Eq. 12, Eve needs to adjust the orientation angle of the
attack to keep the excess noise within a secure value at different transmission distances.
In the following simulation, Alice’s modulation variance VA = 19 and reconciliation
efficiency β = 95% [37, 38, 39].
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Figure 3. The estimated excess noise under the polarization attack (solid line) and
tolerable excess noise under collective attack (dash line).
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Figure 4. The ideal secret key rate whose the channel parameters are experiment
results (dashed line), the maximal secret key rate available for Eve (dotted line) and
the ratio of them (solid line, left y axis) vs transmission distance.
The tolerable excess noise is the minimal value that Eve needs to introduce to
acquire secret key [36]. Therefore Eve can acquire all key information by introducing
the tolerable noise and reducing the estimated excess noise to a normal value(0.005) [8]
by the polarization attack. Fig. 3 shows the minimal introduced excess noise for Eve to
acquire all secret key information. By applying the polarization attack, the estimated
excess noise can be biased to a normal value 0.005. The PMR k is 0.5 in this simulation.
The secret key rate is completely determined by the channel parameters. The secret
key rate under the polarization attack or not can be expressed by K (T ′, ǫ′) and K (T, ǫ).
We assume that ǫ introduced by Eve is set as the tolerable excess noise. Therefore, the
secret key rate K (T, ǫ) without the polarization attack remains 0 at all distance and all
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Figure 5. The corresponding orientation angle modulated by Eve vs transmission
distance with different k: 0.8 (solid line) 0.6 (dashed line) 0.4 (dotted line).
secret key established by Alice and Bob is insecure. Although the estimated key rate
K (T ′, ǫ′) seems secure when Eve applies the attack, these secret key information is all
available for Eve.
Fig. 4 shows that the attack will slightly reduce the estimated transmittance, so
the available key rate K (T ′, ǫ′) for Eve will be slightly reduced. The ideal secret key
rate K (T, 0.005) associates to the channel parameters wihch are experiment results [8]
is also illustrated in Fig. 4. The ratio of K (T ′, ǫ′) to K (T, 0.005) indicates that the
secret key rate available for Eve is gradually approaching to the ideal secret key rate as
the distance increases. Because the excess noise needed to be concealed is considerably
small as the channel loss increases, the decline of the estimated transmittance caused
by the attack is also less significant. Therefore, the polarization attack is more effective
and imperceptible with low channel transmission or at long distance (≥ 10km).
The orientation angle which should be modulated by Eve at different distance
is shown in Fig. 5 with different PMR k. Because the transmittance T and the
minimal introduced excess noise ǫ both decrease with the increasing of distance, the
orientation angle modulated by Eve is also reduced which matches the Eq. 12. Only the
unmeasured LO pulses can be manipulated by Eve, the lower PMR suggests that the
bigger orientation angle is needed to reduce the estimated excess noise. The influence
of the attack is limited by the PMR. The most powerful attack which can be applied
by Eve makes cos θ = 0, the transmittance and excess noise estimation is reduced to
T ′ = k2T
ε′=ε− 1
T
(
1
k2
− 1) . (14)
As a result, the estimation of legal parties has a minimum value and the value is
limited by the PMR. If the PMR is promoted to 100%, the polarization attack will not
be effective to the system.
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Figure 6. The ratio of the estimated transmittance to the practical value vs
transmission distance with k = 0.8 (solid line) k = 0.6 (dashed line) k = 0.4 (dotted
line).
In realistic environments, the estimated channel transmittance which depends on
several factors, for example the phase noise may lead the fluctuation of the estimated
transmittance [34]. The transmittance is also affected by the attack. A slight fluctuation
of the transmittance is reasonable in CV-QKD, but too much deviation may still be
noticed by Alice and Bob. We show the ratio of transmittance between two cases in
Fig. 6. The estimated transmittance is reduced to nearly 85% of the practical value when
the distance is less than 10km. As the distance increases over 30km, the estimated
transmittance keeps getting closer to the practical value and they nearly equals. It
means that Alice and Bob can not observe the attack by the abnormal transmittance
over a certain distance.
5. Conclusion
We propose a polarization attack against the practical security of CV-QKD systems
to conceal the introduced excess noise. Because the polarization drift rate is usually
lower than the repetition frequency of the system, the polarization measurement for
compensation can be only applied on part of LO pulses to simplify the physical
implementation. This scheme opens a practical loophole for Eve to control the
homodyne result by modulating the orientation angle of the unmeasured LO pulses.
The SNU is positively correlated with the intensity of the LO which can be reduced by
the modulation on the orientation angle of the LO pulses in the channel. As a result,
the practical SNU can be controlled by Eve during the secret key distribution. The
effect of the polarization modulation on LO is also demonstrated by the experiment and
the polarization attack can lower the practical SNU than the calibrated one.
The parameter estimation under the polarization attack shows that the estimated
excess noise is controlled by Eve with a slight decrease of the estimated transmittance.
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At different distances, the estimated excess noise can be manipulated at a secure
value. Alice and Bob can not observe that the key distribution is no longer secure.
Since the attack is based on the limited polarization measurement rate, the most
simple countermeasure is to raise the PMR to 100%, which will close the loophole
of the practical system. Because the core of the polarization attack is to utilize the
difference between the calibrated SNU and the practical one, another countermeasure
is the real-time shot noise measurement [40] which is effective for all attacks against
the shot noise. To completely close the detection loopholes, the most secure way is
the currently proposed continuous-variable measurement-device-independent quantum
key distribution protocols [41, 42, 43, 44], which can remove all known and unknown
loopholes on the detection. In the recently proposed CV implementations whose LO is
generated ”locally” [45, 46, 47], the polarization attack can not be directly implemented
to control the practical SNU. But the polarization of the reference pulses could still
be controlled by Eve to affect the measurement results, the specific attack against the
”local” LO schemes could be analyzed in further research.
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APPENDIX: Calculation of the secret key rate
The secret key rate of CV-QKD protocols is calculated with the covariance matrix.
We suppose the final quantum state shared by Alice and Bob is ρAB with a covariance
matrix
γAB=
[
(VA + 1) I
√
T (V 2
A
+ 2A)σz√
T (V 2
A
+ 2A)σz (TVA + 1 + Tǫ) I
]
, (15)
we only show the secret key rate for reverse reconciliation [33]
K = βI (A : B)− S (E : B) , (16)
where I (A : B) is the classical mutual entropy between Alice and Bob, S(E : B) =
S (E) − S (E |xB ) is the quantum mutual entropy between Eve and Bob[48], and β is
the reconciliation efficiency. The mutual information between Alice and Bob reads
I (A : B) =
1
2
log
2
VA
VA − C
2
AB
VB
=
1
2
log
2
(
VA + 1 + χ
χ+ 1
)
, (17)
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where χ = 1−T
T
+ ǫ. Since Eve’s system E can purify AB, we have S (E) = S (AB).
S (AB) is calculated with the two symplectic eigenvalues (λ1, λ2) of the covariance
matrix γAB [23, 7]
S (AB) = G [(λ1 − 1)/2] +G [(λ2 − 1)/2] , (18)
where G (x) = (x+ 1) log
2
(x+ 1) − xlog
2
x is the Von Neumann entropy [49]. Then
the system AE is also a pure state after Bob’s measurement, S (E |xB ) = S (A |xB ).
S (A |xB ) is a function of the symplectic eigenvalue (λ3) of the covariance matrix γxBA
S (A |xB )=G [(λ3 − 1)/2] , (19)
the covariance matrix γxB
A
[23] is
γxB
A
= γB − CTAB(XγAX)MPCAB. (20)
where X = diag(1, 0) and MP denotes the Moore-Penrose inverse of the matrix.
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